starting point for gaining acceptance for villagers' committees was to accept that there was a political crisis in the countryside that probably could only be resolved by allowing the villagers enhanced capacity for self-government. 9 Despite reformers' hopes that the level of direct election would be raised to the township, the same logic does not apply and the vested institutional interests opposing change are stronger. 10 Support has come from within the people's consultative conference system and the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) that oversees the village elections. In March 1998, the MOCA official in charge of elections drafted a document suggested that township elections might be carried out if conditions were ripe. This was rejected by the Politburo, although Wen Jiabao among others was said to have supported the idea during discussions at Beidaihe. 9 Daniel Kelliher, "The Chinese Debate over Village Self-Government", The China Journal, No. 37 (January 1997), pp. 31-62. 10 On institutional opposition from the people's congress system and the party's organization bureau see He, "From Village to Township", pp. 10-11. 11 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 12 South China Morning Post, March 9, 1999. 13 Renmin ribao, March 16, 2000, p. 1.
One major institutional barrier to raising the level is that township elections would not, presumably, fall under the domain of MOCA but more likely the people's congress system. This would require establishing principles and understanding within an entirely different administrative system. Apart from contravening current legal provisions for the township people's congress to appoint the township head, it would fundamentally challenge the control of the local party apparatus. It is perhaps unsurprising that to date neither township leaders nor the people's congress system have expressed enthusiasm for direct township leader elections. Baogang He's survey of 115 township leaders in Zhejiang found that over 77 percent found direct elections premature, while a survey of 536 township leaders found 55 percent declaring them premature, with a further 19.8 percent considering them not suitable. 14 However, given the lack of any official promotion, it may also be considered surprising that one in five township leaders would support elections.
The National People's Congress (NPC) under Li Peng has not supported expanding the scope of direct elections. A number of provinces including Guangdong sent requests to the NPC to conduct elections but all were rejected. 15 Shenzhen, in particular, was particularly keen in late-1997-early-1998 to push ahead with direct township elections. It hoped to experiment with two townships in 1998 as a prelude to electing all township heads subsequently. Shenzhen has been keen to maintain its place as a pacesetter and its officials have sought to claim that it would be right for it to be at the forefront of political reform having lead in economic reform through the 1980s and early 1990s. However, the senior leadership in Beijing was not so supportive and the General Office of the NPC put the brake on reform attempts in Shenzhen. 16 14 He, "From Village to Township", pp. 7-8. 15 Yazhou zhoukan (Asia Week), February 8-14, 1999. 16 Interviews with Shenzhen party leaders, July 2001.
It appears that not only Li Peng but also Jiang Zemin is no supporter of direct township head elections 17 and in July 2001 a Central Committee document tried to call a halt to experimentation by declaring that the direct election of township heads were unconstitutional and contrary to the organic law on local people's congresses and people's governments. 18 To date, party preference has been to deal with issues of government transparency rather than accountability at the township level. Thus, in June 1998 a joint Central Committee and State Council Circular recognized that government reform should be encouraged for the 45 000 towns and townships stating that the party should "seek proper ways to introduce the practice of open administration in government bodies at the township level". This has become increasingly common practice with provinces such as Fujian, Hunan, and Shanxi, at the forefront of making township revenue and expenditures public and having an open system for government construction contracts. In Guangxi, townships have established supervisory groups to oversee administration. Such groups include members of the people's congress, delegates from the party committee, the disciplinary and control commission, retired cadres, and villagers' delegates. 19 The Sixteenth Party Congress (2002) did not offer hope for progress on the direct election of township heads but rather stressed the need to tighten party control to maintain social stability. In fact, the sections in Jiang's report to the Congress on political restructuring 17 According to Lianjiang Li, Jiang told Anhui delegates at the 2001 NPC session that the villagers' committee elections should not be extended upwards. Li, "The Politics of", p. 704. 18 Document no. 12 July 2001, "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhuanfa 'Zhonggong quanguo renda changweihui dangzu guanyu quanguo xiangji renmin daibiao dahui huanjie xuanju gongzuo youguan wenti de yijian' de tongzhi" ( Notice of the Central Committee t=of the Chinese Communist party on Transmitting 'Suggestions of the Party group of the Standing Committee of the NPC on Certain Questions Concerning the Election of Township Level People's Congresses'). 19 See Liu Xitang, "Guanyu xiangji minzhu fazhan de diaocha yu sikao" ( dealt only with regularizing the party's relationship with various state institutions and mass organizations. Jiang stressed that the "party commands the overall situation" and on the people's congress specifically, noted that they were to ensure that party's views become the "will of the state" and that "candidates recommended by party organizations become leading cadres of the organs of state power through legal procedures."
20
Such an emphasis is not likely to accommodate elections in which candidate choice and selection are taken out of the control of party organization departments. It seems likely that Jiang's view was influenced by both the attempts of the China Democratic Party to register in various provinces and the fear that campaigning may be taken advantage of by Falungong members.
21
This has not resolved, however, how the party deals with enhancing legitimacy at the township level and finding candidates that will enjoy a modicum of local support. Before the Circular was issued, in 1998 three townships experimented with the direct election of township heads with all wishing to claim the title of the first in China to democratically elect a township leader. These were Buyun and Nanchang in Sichuan and Dapeng in Shenzhen,
The Dapeng election was deemed to fall within the current regulatory framework and the Nancheng election was closely controlled by the provincial organization department but Buyun was deemed unconstitutional. 22 However, this has not marked the end of experimentation more broadly nor within the Suining Municipality, where Buyun is located.
In addition to the direct election in Buyun, Suining's Shizhong (Central) District has experimented with other innovative measures to broaden civic engagement and increase 20 Jiang Zemin, "Build a Well-Off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics", http://english.peopledaily.com.cn. November 8, 2002. 21 He, "From Village to Township". P. 2. 22 The Nancheng election was held on December 5 1998 while that in Buyun was held on December 31. Thus, while Nancheng may claim the title of the first such election since 1949, the moral high-ground lies with Buyun. As Lianjiang Li notes "it was freer, fairer and more competitive in almost all aspects than the earlier Nancheng election." Li, "the Politics of", pp. 714-15. For an extensive account of the Nancheng competition in selecting township leaders, including the party secretary and township head.
In particular, Shizhong was praised for developing a process within existing regulations that "increased transparency and competition in promoting cadres". 23 The term used by the local organization department is "open recommendation and selection" (gongtui gongxuan).
24
Unlike the direct Buyun election, this process does not contravene existing regulations and is more acceptable as it ensures a strong role for the local party and state institutions.
25
ORS is also used for the selection of party secretaries thus opening up the process to ordinary party members rather than restricting appointment to higher level party officials. A degree of competition replaces secretive appointment from above.
In the following sections we discuss the four main approaches adopted to date for the selection of township leadership. We concentrate mainly on ORS. In the conclusions we make some tentative observations about how the experiments impact on China's on-going institutional transformation and the tension between maintaining a Leninist organizational framework while seeking to broaden participation to enhance legitimacy. Among other winners that were related to elections were: Qianxi County in Hebei Province for its direct election of delegates to Women's Associations and Guangshui Municipality (Hubei) for its "Two)ballot" election for party secretaries at the village level. 24 Nanbu County in Sichuan Province has also used this system but only for deputy heads. See Li, "An Investigation of and Thoughts on", p. 73. 25 The Buyun election breaches Article 101 of the State Constitution that states "Local people's congresses at the different levels elect and have the power to recall, at the corresponding level, governors and deputy governors, mayors and deputy mayors, heads and deputy heads of counties, districts, townships, and towns". Further the Organic Law for Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments reiterates these powers of appointment and removal of personnel. 26 While the account by Joseph Cheng on the Buyun and Dapeng elections is essentially descriptive, Lianjiang Li's analysis takes the optimistic view that the new leadership may be more amenable to acceptance and that the international community can play a role in protecting grassroots' experiments. We
New Methods of Township Leadership Selection
As noted above, the situation of the township is completely different from that of the villages where direct elections, with the exception of party leaders, have been institutionalized. Township cadres working on the lowest rung of the state ladder are recruited and paid by the state and are in full-time employ. Village leaders are part-time and are compensated for their work out of the village's own finances. The social structure of the township is naturally more diverse than that of the village, making community-based politics more complex while population size, geographic spread, and employment mix makes the construction of participatory politics within the existing framework more difficult. It will require more careful institutional design, as well as political and financial support.
During the 1990s, it is clear that in many areas problems have arisen between local administrations and society and the township has been the focal point for unrest and conflict.
The townships have many demands placed on them by higher level authorities with little independent capacity or incentive to carry out programs that will benefit the local society.
This weakens the capacity for comprehensive development by township governments. One set of Chinese researchers has even referred to the responsibilities of the townships being "dismembered" by the county. Most government agencies at the township level actually receive contracts for their work from the county and this undermines the township's capacity to co-ordinate the work of their functional agencies as the administrative power in are more circumspect and view ORS as a viable way of broadening participation while resisting direct elections.
the township region does not belong to the township. 27 Many of the quotas or tasks handed down are obligatory and township leaders will be reprimanded and their promotion chances diminished by poor performance. Failure to meet one of the hard targets will negate good performance in all other areas. This is referred to as "one ticket override" (yipiao foujue).
Failure to meet this target will result in public criticism, fines, transfer or demotion for the party secretary and township head. and "difficult to deal with" (banshi nan). The resultant system that comes from this contracting arrangement with limited financial resources produces a "pressurized system" (yalixing tizhi). This is defined as the "management mode of dividing up tasks and the system of conducting assessment by giving material awards adopted by the political organization at the county or township level in order to develop the economy and attain the targets set by the higher authorities".
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Essentially the party and administrative organizations at the county level divide up the tasks and set the targets for the organization and individuals at the lower levels and require them to accomplish them within a prescribed period of time. There are usually one, three and five year contracts. The higher level makes it decision on political and economic rewards and penalties for organizations and individuals at the lower levels according to how well they have accomplished these tasks. 31 It is rare to use financial penalties for officials at the township level, as their salaries are considered too low. However, a failure to meet priority targets will lead to demerits on file, possible transfer and certainly to future financial gains forgone.
level, 35 percent of their salary is collected directly from farmers. 32 With so much of the revenues tied up in salary and benefits for local officials, it is not surprising that a common name for township finances are "Eating finances" (chifan caizheng). Despite the unreliability of finance, most township governments are overstaffed as it still represents one of the best alternatives for employment and it does offer the opportunity for extraction.
Last but not least these factors have created frictions between local officials and farmers. The burden of revenue collection is passed onto the farmers in the form of illegal fines and levies, commonly referred to as the "three arbitraries" (san luan-luan shoufei arbitrary taxation, luan fakuan arbitrary fines, and luan tanpei arbitrary expropriation).
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At the same time that they are confronted with the inadequacies of the local administration, many farmers have become more aware of their rights through the mass media, the popularization of laws and regulations, and from the migration to the cities. With the existing system not providing any formal effective channels for redress of grievance the end result has often been violence, blockading townships or attacking township officials. 34 The recognition that township governing structures are failing them seems to be behind party leaders' willingness to allow limited institutional experimentation to improve transparency and accountability and to restore authority and legitimacy. Thus, there is the recognition of the need for institutional innovation to deal with these problems and this might even provide the possibility for further political restructuring of local government. However, this process will not be allowed to proceed without strong oversight and thus capacity for far-reaching change remains circumscribed.
A few innovators have focused on the process of the selection of township heads.
Yet, the options within the current administrative framework remain limited as the power of appointment of the township head lies with the people's congress. In fact, the reality is that the candidate must be first nominated by the party committee at the next higher level 000, you will get promoted".
35
Yet county party authorities also have a stake in ensuring that their choice for candidate will be popular and will enjoy some modicum of a popular mandate. This would help strengthen the party's legitimacy at the local level and would help it to rejuvenate itself by incorporating members who enjoy local credibility. In addition, as in the villages it is expected that this will help with better implementation of unpopular policies. This train of thinking has legitimated experimentation with the selection of township heads. To date, there have been four main methods.
1) Direct Election of Township Head
According to current regulations, direct election of a township head by the local residents is illegal. Despite this a few townships have held direct elections, the most widely publicized example being Buyun Township in Suining Municipality, Sichuan. A few weeks earlier, Nancheng Township in Qingshen County, Sichuan also held a direct election for the township head and deputy. 36 However, because of the influence of the Buyun experiment we shall focus on this here and refer to Nancheng where relevant.
37
The entire process in Buyun took about two months from preparation to the actual voting. In November 1998, the Party Committee of Shizhong District in Suining decided to hold direct elections in Buyun, a small township far way from the Municipality.
38
It appears that the district party committee made the decision without consultation with higher levels and drafted an electoral constitution for direct elections.
39
This outlined the process for nominating candidates. In addition to organizations (political parties, social organizations, and mass organizations), 30 voters could endorse a candidate for nomination. In Buyun, as in Nancheng, the party placed itself clearly in control of the selection mechanism. The 36 For information see www.dajun.com.cn/xiangzhenxuanju.htm. Li Fan, "A Brave Experiment with Electoral Reform in China; the Direct Election of a Township Head in Nanchang Township". 37 For further details of the Buyun election readers are referred to Cheng, "Direct Elections", pp.118-30 and Li, "The Politics of", 710-19. We shall just highlight the key aspects here. 38 Buyun has a population of around 16 000 living in an area of 32 square kilometers. Another 4000 people work outside of its jurisdiction. The average per capita income is 1636 yuan. It is less developed than other townships in the district. There are 10 villagers' committees in the township. Nancheng has a population of 19 000 in 14 villages. The process is Nancheng was somewhat longer but interestingly began with a questionnaire circulated to 750 households of which 723 responded. The survey found that over 95 percent of party officials and 85 percent of the general public thought that election of deputy township heads would be beneficial. As a result of this the county and Nancheng set up groups to oversee the elections. At both levels the group was headed by the party secretary. 39 Suining shi Shizhongqu gongkai xuanba xiang (zhen) renmin zhengfu xiang (zhen) zhang zanxing banfa 
Leadership Group for the Work of Direct Election of Buyun Township was, according to
Joseph Cheng, under even stronger party control than the group that oversaw the election of deputies to the Township people's congress, while the Buyun Election Committee was headed by the party secretary. All of the village-level direct election leadership groups were headed by village party secretaries. 40 Following the endorsed procedures 15 candidates were nominated, some of who were members of the township party and government leadership while others had no party affiliation nor had any leadership position. 41 These 15 candidates were then considered by a joint electoral committee consisting of 162 members who would make a final selection of two candidates. The committee was drawn from village heads, village party secretaries, and three village representatives from each of the 10 villages, members of the township party committee and other leaders from the township party and government organizations. The candidates had twenty minutes to make a campaign speech and a further 10 minutes for questions and answers. The final two were a schoolteacher who was not a party member and a village committee head who defeated those with posts in the party and government administration. 42 To ensure that the district authorities were not entirely by-passed, they used their constitutional right of nomination to propose that the Buyun Party Committee deputy secretary, Tan Xiaoqiu, be added to the list of final candidates. 40 Cheng, "Direct Elections", pp. 120-21 and 136-37. 41 Six who were members of the election committees withdrew from these positions and, at a review held on December 14-15, the election committee found all candidates acceptable. 42 In Nancheng ten individuals were proposed of whom two declined to run. Unlike in Buyun the candidates were screened by the Nancheng township party committee and the county organization department rather than a specially constituted body. The three candidates selected made short speeches at a meeting in the local primary school and did not answer questions. The meeting was for a select group of township and village cadres, heads of party cells, election representatives and congress delegates. Li Fan, Zhongguo jiceng minzhu, p. 378. Tan Xiaoqiu thus became the first directly elected township head to take office.
He took his oath of office on January 4, 1999 after the township congress had approved the voting.
As noted above the election became a focal point of brief discussion before it was declared unconstitutional. This method has not been used since. The election also contained a number of other innovative measures including not arranging the candidates in alphabetical order on the ballot sheets. One-third of the ballot sheets had each candidate as the first name to ensure fairness and that if people simply voted for the first name thinking that this is what they were supposed to do, it would not unduly distort the results. In addition, photos of the three candidates were exhibited at the voting booths in order to help illiterate voters identify their candidate. 43 It is estimated that almost all of the inhabitants heard the various speeches and 650 raised questions. The questions ranged across topics such as agricultural production, farmers' burdens, taxation, market building, environmental protection, family planning, social security and the construction of village roads and education. 44 The total number of eligible voters was 11 347 of whom 3700 were working outside of the township. The total number of votes cast was 6236. Of those who had remained behind to vote, 81.5 percent cast a vote, giving a voter turnout rate of 54.95 percent. Shizhong's party secretary had insisted that the winning candidate had to receive over 50 percent of the valid votes and that over 50 percent of eligible voters had to vote. Tan just made it on both counts. Lianjiang Li, "The Politics of", p. 714.
2) "Three-Ballot" Election for Township Head
While Buyun was carrying out its election, Dapeng Township in the Longgang District of Shenzhen was preparing its own election for a township head. 45 The method chosen resembles the haixuan principle (literally meaning from the sea) used in village elections that allows candidates to be put forward by local organizations or groups of individuals. The method is also based on that of the "two ballot system" that has been experimented with for the election of village party secretaries. 46 In this process, party members and villagers or villagers' representatives vote in the first round to decide who will be candidates for a second ballot within the party itself. All party members vote to elect the party secretary from the candidates presented. This process is often referred to as a "poll test" or "democratic recommendation". It provides a chance to test the credibility of candidates among the broader populace while ensuring that the party itself keeps control over the final outcome.
When this process is moved to the township level it becomes a "three-ballot" process. The main reason for this is that the township head must be "elected" by the people's congress after a two-round process of recommendation. Thus, a third ballot is necessary. reviewed the qualifications of 6 nominees who had been recommended by over 100 voters.
Five were then proposed for the next stage, one was excluded as he was over 50 years of age and thus disqualified in terms of the recommendation requirements. Campaign speeches and question and answer sessions were held on January 27, after which a group of 1068 representatives voted for which candidate would be put forward as township head. However, it seems that the experiment will not be continued. fact that there is only one candidate provided to the congress rather than multi-candidates weakens the competitiveness of the final election. Last but not least, the desire to remain within the existing regulations seriously circumscribes the extent to which the election can be considered genuinely democratic.
3) "Two-Ballot" Election of Township Head
This method was adopted in Zhuoli Township, Linyi County in Shanxi province in 1999.
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This area is well known for its two-ballot village party election. 51 See Li, "The Two-Ballot System in Shanxi province". 52 These included township government cadres, village party cadres and members of villagers' committees and some village delegates. The Linyi Party Committee also invited a number of other guests to listen to the meeting and to disseminate its ideas. These included cadres from higher levels, some scholars and some reporters.
than a 50 percent level of support in the first two categories was not to be recommended by the township as a candidate for the next party and people's congress elections. In fact, all three gained sufficient support.
Although this system is commonly referred to as a "two ballot" system, the second ballot is not public.
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The township election does not follow on directly from the first vote.
The result of the first vote is only used as reference for the county leaders to consider when appointing the new leadership at the township level. It is also difficult to know the role the work report meeting actually plays in the first ballot. While all eligible voters are entitled to vote to evaluate the township leaders, they were not entitled to listen to their presentations. The precise origins of this method are unclear. 54 As far as we are aware, however, the Shizhong District of Suining Municipality in Sichuan first implemented it on a systematic basis. The Shizhong District organized its ORS during the first half of 1998 and in addition to the township head, the process also involved the selection of the party secretary. 55 Clearly ORS is not an election but rather a process that uses some electoral procedures to enable a representative group broader than the township people's congress to have a strong role in the selection of the candidates. It is different from the traditional way of party selection of officials through the nomenclature as it entails a higher degree of openness and competition. However, it is more open than it is competitive. Consequently the ORS method can be viewed as a transitional institutional process situated between the conventional process of party nomination and congress ratification and a direct election. It is more open and competitive than traditional practice but is less open and competitive than a direct election in terms of public participation.
In late-1997, the Shizhong District Party Committee launched a plan to accelerate reform of its cadre system, recognizing that the current system did not meet the demands of the more complex environment. They decided that the reforms should ensure the recruitment of more highly qualified officials and encourage more participation. In January 1998, the fourth party plenum of Shizhong District presented its work report that included outline of the ORS method. Initially, it was the party's intention only to use the ORS for a 54 In part this derives from the fact that local officials often lack the resources to promote innovation. However, it also stems from the fact that some local officials do not wish to disseminate such experimentation widely to prevent undue attention and pressure from higher levels. 55 The case mentioned by Liu Xitang in Nanbu County, Sichuan occurred four months after that in Shizhong. In addition it only covered the position of township deputy-head. However, the process was extensive with selection to find 178 deputy heads for 79 townships, although the final number selected was 175. Liu, "An Investigation of and thoughts on", p. 73.Liu is an employee of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. While both Cheng and Li mention this process (pp. 710-11 and 118-19 respectively), they do so only as a prelude to the Buyun election and do not discuss it as an independent, on-going process.
limited number of appointments to its functional bureaus and it did not include township heads.
In May 1998, an event occurred in Baoshi Township that changed the minds of the District party leaders. Both the party secretary and the township head were removed from office because of corruption and it appeared that a further 20 township officials were involved, including the chair of the township congress. 56 Given the strong economic growth in the township, the leadership had been regarded highly by the District authorities. This judgment was now called into question and District leaders began to se that there were problems with the traditional closed system of appointment. In addition, because of the host of problems left behind by the disgraced leadership, they had trouble finding a suitable candidate who was willing to work in Baoshi. Not surprisingly such a decision was contentious. Some district leaders felt that as the use of ORS to select a township head in Sichuan was unprecedented it would be risky and might lead to unforeseen problems and failure. The organization department that was to oversee the process lacked experience and the necessary skills to operate the selection. It had to try to learn quickly from others while, at the same time, developing some new measures to deal with problems as they emerged. There was also suspicion among the general public that 56 For an account see Hu Shubao, "Buyun zhixuan diaocha baogao" (An Investigation Report on the Buyun Direct Election), in Beijing yu fenxi (Background and Analysis), no. 25, January 2001, p. 2. 57 As noted below, there were plenty willing to fill the post bu the District leaders were concerned about their suitability and credibility. 58 Such a shift can be deciphered from the decision issued by the party in May. In addition to the township head (zhengke), the other eight positions are all at the deputy level (fuke). the process might not be as open and competitive as was suggested and that the party might have already secretly decided upon the candidate, in line with usual practice. Some of the remaining township officials were also unhappy with the turn of events, as they had anticipated automatic promotion, something that would now be challenged by the implementation of ORS. Despite this opposition and uncertainty, at the end of May, the decision was made to move forward.
On May 12, 1998 the District Party Committee adopted a formal decision to hold the PRPS and a leading group was established to oversee the process. Although the District organization department implemented the selection process, others were represented in the leading group and did participate in the process. Members of the leading group were drawn from the discipline and inspection committee, the propaganda department, the standing committee of the people's congress, the people's political consultative conference and the district government. This helped build an initial consensus and reduce opposition to the process.
The formal procedure began on May 25 with a process of public application. In addition to nominated cadres, party secretaries and village heads in certain townships were allowed to apply if they met certain basic criteria.
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Of the 69 who applied, 67 were considered to be qualified and in June they took a three-hour written exam. This more open process resulted in about half the candidates not being on the state's payroll. 60 The top six candidates from the written exam then had an oral exam on June 22. The oral exam was held in front of a group of 149 Baoshi representatives who whittled the list down to two after all 59 The most important were that they had to be born after June 1, 1960, have graduated from high school and be in good health. There was no requirement concerning official position. 60 See also, Lianjiang Li, "The Politics of", p. 711. established for all potential applicants of which the most important were that they should have at least a college degree, an administrative rank of at least deputy section head (fuke) and be born after September 30, 1958 (thus, under 40). The requirements for party secretary were more stringent than those for township head as village officials were allowed to participate even though they do not enjoy a formal bureaucratic rank. Despite seemingly 61 This group included all 49 township congress delegates, 68 officials from the villages and the township and 32 officials from the district level. 62 Xiang was actually fourth after the written exam. The person who was first after the written exam was placed last after the oral exam. 63 This was at a meeting on organizational work in the countryside held in September 1998. The Shizhong Party Secretary talked to the meeting about the ORS method. strict criteria, there were 99 applicants for the two positions revealing a relatively large pool of candidates.
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Stage two: written examination. This was considered the most objective phase of the selection process. A special group established by the organization department was responsible for designing the examination and it made secret visits to other counties for this purpose. All the questions were kept confidential until the exam and covered areas such as Deng Xiaoping Theory, theory of a market economy, public administration, leadership, laws, science and technology, history, official documents, contemporary politics, essential agricultural work, and agricultural production. The highest possible score was 150 points.
The questions were structured in different ways. For some questions it was necessary to fill in the blank spaces, others were multiple choice while yet others required short reasoned judgments. The case method was also stressed with two cases presented. One case involved investigation by the leader into flood prevention work while the other concerned a case of the villagers suing the government. These were realistic cases for the aspiring leaders to grapple with. In 1998, the Yangtze River area suffered from serious flooding and Sichuan constitutes the vital up-stream area. Thus, flood prevention is an important part of local government work touching on questions of security, development, and livelihood. Sichuan has also become well known for the severity of its rural disturbances in recent years with numerous cases of conflict between the farmers and the local government. Thus, we can see that the written examination did contain some substantive issues that were based on possible real life situations. Review of the written examination led to the selection of the top six 64 There were 69 candidates for the township head positions, of whom two were considered unsuitable. There were 76 candidates for the Hengshan township head election, of whom four were deemed unsuitable. Li Fan, Chuangxin yu fazhan, p. 82.
candidates who then participated in the oral examination. The organization department also set up for them a two-day investigation of the relevant township.
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Stage Three: Oral Examination. This phase more or less resembled a campaign speech with a representative group voting to make a final selection of candidates after listening to speeches and raising questions. Naming this group proved difficult under the existing institutional arrangements and the local organization department simply decided to call it a defense meeting. 65 Obviously two days is too short for the candidates to get to know the township where they might work. It is also too short a period of time for the township residents to interact with the candidates. This was later recognized by the District authorities who stipulated in the "Interim Provisions for the ORS for Township Heads of the Shizhong District of Suining Municipality" that the time for investigation in the township should not be less than seven days. This was drafted on the basis of the first three experiments. The original regulations requiring two to three days can be found in Li Fan, Chuangxin yu fazhan, pp. 86-91. 66 In the three experiments there was no definitive process for stipulating how the representative group should be formed and what its composition should be. The "Interim Provisions" state clearly that the total number of representatives must exceed one percent of the township population (it was to exceed one percent in large and medium townships and two percent in small townships). The total number of cadres from the district level was not to exceed 10 percent of the representatives. 
ORS as a Mechanism for Broader but Controlled Participation
Clearly ORS broadens the scope of participation in selection of local leaders in contrast with traditional methods but it retains the Leninist concern for control of the process should anything deemed untoward happen. Two institutional adjustments are made to broaden participation. First, the criteria for application are lowered. In the case of township head, village officials and lower-ranked cadres (below deputy section chief fuke) are permitted to participate. Having a farmer's status is not a barrier to being able to compete for a formal bureaucratic position that is financed out of the state's budget and which oversees a larger geographic terrain than the village. More younger officials can participate because the requirement for level of bureaucratic rank is lower than usual.
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For example, among 67 applicants in Baoshi, there were 20 (29.9 percent) cadres ranked at that just below that of deputy section chief, namely at gu level, with another 28 (41.28 percent) who were ordinary cadres or village officials. In terms of age, the number of applicants under 33 years formed the majority (41 or 61 percent).
The second institutional innovation is that the voting by the representative group is decisive. This modifies the party's dominance of the entire selection procedure of the township head. Under the old process, the organization department would provide a name list for the party standing committee should positions in a township become vacant. The standing committee of usually seven to nine members would then convene to discuss the recommended candidates. A meeting of the party secretaries would usually precede this meeting.
68
This meeting is the quintessential bargaining and deal-making session where a basic consensus is formed after people horse trade their favorite candidates. The decision is then presented to the standing committee that is highly unlikely to raise criticism of the proposed choices. The final decision is approved and issued in the name of the standing committee. The process is then shifted from the district to the township level. The candidate for party secretary will then be elected party secretary by the township's party congress while the township head will be elected by the people's congress.
Beginning in the 1990s, this traditional process began to be modified with adoption of the process of "democratic recommendation". This meant, in practice, that the organization department called together some staff from a work-unit to request an evaluation of their head. However, this process was more one of form than content as the evaluation did not necessarily have an impact on the decision of the higher level. The work of a township head could potentially affect all in the township but virtually none had input on their appointment. This is also the case with "democratic recommendation" as it is an internal process and excludes the villagers themselves. This is different with the recommendation group in the ORS process even though the old name of "democratic recommendation" is retained. First, it is the representative group not the standing committee that makes the final decision on the candidates. Second, more ordinary cadres participate in the group and not just the district's leading cadres. Two cases are not sufficient to make any robust conclusions but we can make one tentative suggestion about these voting outcomes. The main reason for the convergence is probably that township cadres maintain close working relationships and interact frequently with village officials. This means that a consensus on the candidates is more likely than between the district and the village. In the villages, the candidate's practical capabilities rather than their speech-making capacity is considered more important. By contrast, district level cadres might pay more attention to a candidate's rhetoric and their alignment with the policies of the party and the Shizhong District in particular. Some villagers commented that they preferred a person they saw as honest, credible and modest even if they were not a good public speaker. They felt that it was easier to communicate with such a person.
However, this does not mean that the party has foregone its control and its Leninist predisposition is still apparent. We are not dealing with open representation but a process of a controlled opening to gauge public receptivity to proposed candidates. The last thing the party wants is to put forward a slate of candidates that will be rejected by those they will be overseeing.
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The representative group is much smaller than the potential voter pool. It is 69 As Manion notes when looking at the process for electing people's congress delegates, the system is designed to align preferences of selectorates and electorates. The party wants to select candidates that can elite rather than popular participation. It is limited within the system and is not inclusive with most representatives being drawn from among officialdom at different levels.
It should also be remembered that the party controls the selection of the township heads even though it cannot decide directly who the candidates are let alone which candidate will win. The party exerts its influence in at least three ways. First, it is the only rule maker for the PRPS and monopolizes the privilege of setting the criteria for application, reviewing the applicants, designing the exams, and drafting the voting procedures. The party can manipulate the criteria on age, education level, and years of work to limit the scope of applicants to find those potential officials who fit with its defined needs. In this case, there was a need to provide younger and better-educated officials. As the rules were institutionalized, in fact, the criteria for application were tightened. Thus, in Baoshi
Township the party allowed all cadres below the fuke level to participate but this was limited in the "Interim Provisions" of November 3, 1998. The provisions both raised the years of necessary work experience as well as the level of administrative experience. It was deemed that the candidate should hold a guji position, have a college diploma, and have at least fiveyears' work experience. If the applicant was a farmer, he or she should have worked as a party secretary or village head for more than three years.
Second, the party can still move the township officials elected by PRPS at will. Xiang Daoquan, the township head elected in Baoshi through was moved to Hengshan Township to be party secretary after just one year in office. This showed that the party was not bound by the desire of the representative group, especially not that of its local participants.
Whatever it may be the PRPS process is not an institution to promote democracy. Its primary role is to increase the talent pool and vet effective cadres. This could undermine the win an election and thus enhance the party's own legitimacy. Manion, "Chinese Democratization in longer-term effectiveness of the process. In fact, some cadres in the organization department were also concerned about the speed with which Xiang was moved. They felt that local residents would not believe that PRPS was effective and that township heads might not devote themselves to their work sufficiently if they thought that they could still be moved at will. Some villagers and Xiang himself thought that it would have been better to work longer in Baoshi as he had become familiar with the township and as he had been "elected" for the job.
Last but not least, most officials are still party members meaning that their ties of loyalty are still to the party organization rather than the local community. Most applicants are party members. For example, In Baoshi 52 of the 67 (77.6 percent) of the applicants were party members while only two applicants came from the other ("democratic") political parties.
Concluding Comments: Institutional Innovation and Economic Development
At first glance it may seem strange that these innovations have taken place in Suining, a small municipality in the west of China that lags economically behind the more developed areas of the East. More conventional wisdom on the relationship between economic development and political reform would suggest that Suining is an unlikely candidate to be a pioneer of political reform.
Of course we are dealing with institutional innovation rather than democratization In poorer areas, the impact of a crisis is likely to be felt first and this can cause innovation by the local government. This was the case with Suining. Both general factors and some specific causes explain Suining's decision to undertake institutional innovation.
First, local governments in many poor areas lack the revenue to meet basic public needs or to respond to crises. This can create the need to innovate with existing institutions. Opening up the political system or broadening public participation is likely, however, only to be a measure of last resort. Second, local communities in poorer areas may be less riven by interest groups and the forces of pluralism. This may facilitate consensus building about alternative solutions. Third, innovation initiated by government might be accepted more readily. Local societies might not have much information about alternatives, especially if migration is not particularly significant. Under these circumstances the combination of remoteness would allow for more experimentation, as it does not fall under such strict scrutiny from the political center. At the same time, the innovation is liable to be within existing institutional frameworks as access to information on alternatives will be limited.
In the specific case of Suining, the economic scandal caused by the corruption of local cadres pushed the District leadership to reconsider the method through which they selected township officials. The fact that ORS appeared successful in Baoshi led them to broaden the process to other townships and to the selection of the party secretary. The use of ORS for the selection of the party secretary is more significant than that of township head because it opens up the internal operations of the party to a broader but albeit limited public.
Even though participation was limited, the oral examination and the structure of the recommendation group would result in most inhabitants knowing a lot more about prospective candidates than would normally be the case.
Leadership is also important in promoting or resisting change. and persisted over the objections of some members of the party standing committee. Her continued support enabled the trial sites to complete the work and the success in these areas then gave confidence to other district leaders to persist with the reform. 71 Regional competition also played a role in pushing ahead innovation. Some scholars have argued that competition among local governments wishing to improve economic growth has been a major force promoting fast economic growth.
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While political innovation is much riskier than economic, competition also exists in this area. Localities can be willing to act as trial sites for experimentation because of potential recognition and benefits higher levels might bestow on them. If experimentation is successful, local leaders might be promoted more quickly. In Suining, the ORS process attracted attention from the Sichuan provincial party committee and also some scholars based in Beijing. Zhang Jinming, as noted above, made a presentation to the provincial organization department in September 1998 that promoted the experiment. Through discussions with the scholars at present she became aware that Dapeng in Shenzhen was planning to hold a direct election for township head. As a result, she decided to speed up the process for the direct election in Buyun to ensure that it would be the first in China. Cadres in Suining were very proud to be known as the first to hold a direct election while those in Shenzhen were disappointed by the news that they had been beaten.
Crisis might produce a one-time experimentation but it is more difficult to ensure sustainability of a new institutional innovation. Once the perceived crisis is past there is a tendency to set aside the innovation. However, in the case of ORS momentum has been It is an attempt to deal with the evolving reality at the local level and to improve the quality of the officials that are appointed to key posts. Certainly, there was a demand with over 60 applicants for each position, revealing that in a poorer area such as Suining a job in the bureaucracy is considered a good thing. 75 It also provides the party with feedback from society about the kinds of individuals that it is selecting and in this sense provides a modicum of democratization within the local party apparatus. PRPS allows more party members at the grass-roots level to participate in the choice of party secretaries at the next higher level. In fact, they dominate the representative group. This process can help broaden the base of the party's legitimacy at the local level.
This does not mean that the party's Leninist predilection has been abandoned nor is there any indication that processes such as PRPS are seen as a stepping stone to direct elections at the township level. The organization department remains in control of the reform of the cadre system and the relationship between the representative groups, the people's congress and the party committee remain unclear. The party will still guide the process of selection and, as we have seen, can still remove or transfer those selected whenever they choose to do so. Senior party leaders have vacillated on the question as to whether direct elections at the township level would be a good thing or not. On balance they have tended to resist this move. The Central Secretariat of the CCP issued a document in September 2001 that called for experimentation with township elections to be postponed as the existing legal framework did not provide adequate legitimacy for this. 76 However, while the Center vacillates, local governments and party institutions have to find real solutions to the problems that confront them. Perhaps the biggest problem is that of legitimacy of the governing organs themselves. This would suggest that we might see more local institutional innovation that tries to walk the fine line of broadening civic participation while retaining Leninist organizational control.
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This may seem a contradiction in terms but without any clear direction from the Center the only solutions for localities are those that operate within existing institutional guidelines and exploit the gray areas to enhance local representation.
76 There seems to be some confusion about this document and its status. Officials who are familiar with the document said that while the document had been issued in the name of the Central Secretariat, it had not been drafted by the Secretariat but rather by officials in the National People's Congress. They claimed that it did not necessary reflect the intention of the party as the drafters were not familiar with the process of the elections at the township level and had just heard a number of complaints about the process. The complaints had formed the basis for their draft. 77 As Baogang He has noted recently, experiments have continued in provinces such as Henan, Guangdong, and Shaanxi where they use less politically contentious terms such as "confidence votes" or "extensive opinion polls." He, "From Village to Township", p. 5. Please note that the number of votes in the columns do not add up to 100 percent as each selector could vote for two candidates if they wished. 
